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En lav dt

reedom?
by Lee C. Bollinger

Editor's note: The following article is an abridged version of
the first chapter of Professor Bollinger's book, The Tolerant
Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in
America. Copyright© 1986 by Oxford University Press,
Inc . Reprinted by permission . Recent reviev.;s in The New
Yorker and The New York Times have applauded the book's
thoughtful, imaginative perspective on the role of freedom of
speech in our society. A paperback edition is expected to be
available in fall, 1987.
111~fi'?:~«~T~ht!;ere is a curious disjunction in our attitudes about the
~

- - degree to which we should tolerate the speech of
others. When we compare our reluctance to impose
legal restraints against speech with our readiness to
employ a host of informal, or nonlegal, forms of coercion against speech behavior, the paradox is striking.
If a person expresses some view we find deeply offensive-say, for example, by making a racially derogatory
comment-we will probably insist on censure of some
kind, and feel guilty if none occurs. To be told that we
ought to restrain ourselves from ever, in any way, coercing or penalizing any person for what that person
says would strike us not only as bizarre but as plainly
wrong.
Within the special realm of the constitutional right of
free speech, on the other hand, our response is quite
different. As soon as someone proposes making it
unlawful to say something offensive, and to assess
criminal or civil penalties for any violations, the general free speech principle will be invoked, and in all
likelihood the whole plan will be tossed aside as
unacceptable.
Under the principle of free speech, we celebrate selfrestraint, we create a social ethic of tolerance, and we
pursue it to an extreme degree. At the same time, for
many people it is, and has been, this extremeness that
is the most inexplicable and troublesome feature of free
speech in the United States. They can readily understand the sense of limiting the use of governmental
power to regulate general discussion within the society. But they also have the sense that there must be
limits to any principle and that somehow free speech
has been taken far beyond those limits.
This was revealed for us with painful clarity just a
few years ago in a widely publicized case involving a
Nazi group that claimed the "right" to conduct a march
in a suburb of Chicago called Skokie. At the time, the
population of Skokie included some 40,000 Jews, several thousand of whom were direct survivors of the

World War II concentration camps . This, of course, was
not lost upon the self-proclaimed Nazis. Nor was their
purpose lost upon those who stood witness to the projected event. It was perfectly clear to everyone that a
primary aim of the Nazis was to inflict as much insult
and fear as they could on the Skokie residents, and
no doubt on other Jews as well. And yet, the results
reached by the two highest courts that considered
the issues-a federal court of appeals and the Illinois
Supreme Court-were the same: This "speech activity"
was protected by the First Amendment to the
Constitution .
Few legal disputes in the last decades caught the
public eye with such dramatic power as did that case.
For well over a year, as the case moved ponderously
through the courts, it was seldom out of the news and
often on the front pages of newspapers when it was in
the news. When the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) took up the legal defense of the Nazis, its
membership rolls gave telling evidence of the public
dissatisfaction, even incredulity, at the free speech
position in the case. Thirty thousand members
resigned their membership, at an annual cost in lost
revenues to the organization of half a million dollars.
To many people this was not freedom of speech, it was
the abuse of a liberty, the license to inflict harm on
other people . Even if one viewed the Nazi aims in
more modest terms, as that of only establishing a fascist regime, the assertion of a free speech right seemed
only to raise a profound paradox: Why, after all,
should a free speech principle be extended to those
who would use it to advocate the destruction of that
liberty?
Actually, these reservations about the extension of
the free speech principle to cover this kind of extremist
speech were but echoes of a similar indictment heard at
the very inception of the modem free speech principle.
The attack was by John Wigmore, a law professor and
dean at Northwestern University Law School and a
scholarly figure of major stature . The object of Wigmore's indictment was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's
dissent in Abrams v. United States-a dissent that was to
provide the underpinnings of the contemporary free
speech principle.
Abrams involved a prosecution of five Russian aliens
for distributing leaflets in New York City in August,
1918. These leaflets praised the Russian Revolution,
denounced President Wilson for attempting to intervene and reverse the successes of the communists, and
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urged the workers in the United States (particularly
munitions workers) to protest by engaging in a general strike. The Russians were prosecuted under the
Espionage Act, a World War I piece of legislative
handiwork that proscribed a variety of activities that
the Congress had deemed potentially harmful to
the war effort.
A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding no violation of the First Amendment. For
precedent, these justices relied heavily on three cases
decided earlier the same year, which ironically had
been authored on behalf of the Court by Holmes himself. The first of that trilogy (and the first important
Supreme Court decision on the First Amendment
since its adoption), Schenck v. United States, was in
many important respects seemingly very similar to
Abrams. Schenck had been the general secretary of the
Socialist Party, and he, along with another member of
the party's executive board, was charged with having
distributed some 15,000 leaflets in which it was argued,
in "impassioned language," that the conscription law
was immoral and unconstitutional and that people
should resist.

Under the principle of free speech, we
celebrate self-restraint, we create a social ethic
of tolerance, and we pursue it to an extreme
degree. At the same time, for many people it
is, and has been, this extremeness that is the
most inexplicable and troublesome feature of
free speech in the United States.

This prosecution was also under the Espionage
Act. Holmes dealt with the case by pointing out the
necessity of drawing some limits on the free speech
principle. While, he said, the Court was prepared to
"admit that in many places and in ordinary times the
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular
would have been within their constitutional rights,"
the actual scope of the protection afforded by the
First Amendment depended upon the exact context
in which the speech occurred. Thus, in words now
immortalized: "[T)he most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in a theatre and causing a panic." The guiding principle
for Holmes, therefore, was "whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." To Holmes "[i]t was a question of
proximity and degree."
Applying this principle to the Schenck prosecution,
Holmes appeared to have little difficulty in finding
for the government. "When a nation is at war," he
28

cautioned, "many things that might be said in time
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and
that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right."
The majority in Abrams seemed to think similarly.
Holmes, however, now did not, and the reason for his
seeming turnabout has been a matter of controversy
and speculation ever since.
In his Abrams dissent, Holmes set forth, in memorable words, his primary argument for free speech:
[w]hen men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideasthat the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
Within the legal community today, the Abrams dissent of Holmes stands as one of the central organizing
pronouncements for our contemporary vision of free
speech. And the scope of the shelter it extends to
speech activity is very wide indeed, for under it the
First Amendment protects against legal interference
all speech activity until the point at which it "so imminently threaten[ s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country."
To this definition of the scope of tree speech,
Wigrnore took strenuous objection in an article published in the Illinois Law Review shortly after the Abrams
decision. Much of Wigmore's concern in the article is
with the specific facts involved in the Abrams case.
By August, 1918, he says, the outcome of the war
depended greatly on the still uncertain capability of
the country to produce the munitions needed to supply the soldiers then in the trenches in France-which,
of course, it had been the aim of the Abrams defendants
to disrupt.
In Wigmore's view, however, Holmes's principal
failing was the manifestation ofa generally misguided
and distorted social vision posturing under the banner
of freedom of speech. "And so the danger now is,"
Wigmore wrote, "rather that this misplaced reverence
for freedom of speech should lead us to minimize or
ignore other fundamentals which in today's conditions
are far more in need of reverence and protection. Let
us show some sense of proportion in weighing the several fundamentals."
While Wigrnore conceded that the defendants' acts
by themselves were unlikely to harm the war effort, he
pointed out that ordinarily the society is not denied the
power to punish those who set out to commit crimes,
but for one reason or another fail in the effort.
For Wigrnore, the other side of the coin was the ten-

a
dency to overemphasize the need to secure the liberty
of speech against restriction:
After all, is not this tenderness for the right of
freedom of speech an over-anxiety? ... Do we
not really possess, in the fullest permanent
safety, a freedom and license for the discussion of
the pros and cons of every subject under the sun?
Simply as a matter of "free trade in ideas," is there
not in Anglo-America today an irrevocably established free trade in every blasphemous, scurrilous, shocking, iconoclastic, or lunatic idea that
any fanatical or unbalanced brain can conceive?
And is there any axiom of law, constitution, morals, religion, or decency which you and I cannot
today publicly dispute with legal immunity?
As Wigmore set about defining the proper limits of
the free speech principle, he sought to minimize the
disjunction to which I referred at the outset between
our personal and our constitutional thinking about
those limits, trying to bring the latter more in line with
the former. In the "abnormal" situation of wartime,
which was true of the Abrams case, Wigmore found
the proper line by defining what was an appropriate
"moral" response to the Abrams type of expression.
He found that the "moral right of the majority to enter
upon the war imports the moral right to secure success
by suppressing public agitation against the completion
of the struggle." To believe otherwise, in Wigmore's
view, is to favor freedom at the expense of a nation's
inherent right to govern itself and to ensure its own
survival.

Within the legal community today, the
Abrams dissent of Holmes stands as one of
the central organizing pronouncements for
our contemporary vision of free speech.

Wigmore's charges against Holmes's position on the
scope of the First Amendment have been repeated in
the subsequent decades, whenever First Amendment
protection for extremist speech has been sought. Free
speech has become such a fixture of the American
identity that our critical faculties may be unconsciously
suspended when we are in its presence, an ironic
result given the commonly understood purpose of
the principle to remove the shackles on dissent and
to encourage openness of mind.
Have we, it must be asked, fallen victim to what the
intellectual historian Isaiah Berlin called the "suffocating straightjackets" of "great liberating ideas"?
The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel
showed with great brilliance, a changing pattern
of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into
suffocating straightjackets, and so stimulate their

own destruction by new, emancipating, and at
the same time, enslaving conceptions.
This was certainly the uneasy sense, however inarticulate, many people had about the free speech position in the Skokie case-the sense of loss of judgment
and of the ability to draw reasonable lines, to assess
fairly the risks and costs of speech and the risks and
costs to free speech of imposing limits. As it had for
Wigmore in 1920, the disjunction became too great: the
free speech position appeared unjustified, and it raised
disturbing implications.
The controversy began in the spring of 1977 when
Frank Collin, the leader of the Chicago-based National
Socialist Party of America (NSPA), requested a permit
to march in front of the Skokie village hall. The proposed march was to be held in the mid-afternoon, to
take about half an hour, during which time approximately three dozen members would march in single
file in front of the village hall. The group, according to
Collin, would be wearing Nazi-style uniforms, which
he described in chilling detail: "We wear brown shirts
with a dark brown tie, a swastika pin on the tie, a
leather shoulder strap, a black belt with buckle, dark .
brown trousers, black engineer boots, and either a steel
helmet or a cloth cap, depending on the situation, plus
a swastika arm band on the left arm and an American
flag patch on the right arm." Collin's request came in
March, 1977.
After receiving this notification of the intended demonstration, Skokie filed suit in the local circuit court,
seeking an injunction against it. As this litigation
worked its way up and down the line of state courts,
another suit was reaching the federal courts. On May 2,
1977, the march having been temporarily forestalled by
the state court suit, the city enacted three ordinances
purporting to cover all marches and demonstrations.
The first provided various requirements for the issuance of any permit for parades and marches in excess
of 50 persons. Insurance had to be obtained ($300,000
in public liability and $50,000 in property damage) and
assurances given that the group "will not portray criminality, depravity or lack of virtue in, or incite violence,
hatred, abuse or hostility toward a person or group of
persons by reason of reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation."
The second and third ordinances were specifically
criminal laws, violation of which could be punished
by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment of up to six
months .. One forbade the "dissemination of any materials within the Village of Skokie which promotes and
incites hatred against persons by reason of their race,
national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so."
"Dissemination of materials" was defined to include
"display ... of signs" and "public display of markings
and clothing of symbolic significance." The final ordinance prohibited the wearing of "military-style" uniforms during any public demonstration.
Following the enactment of these ordinances, Collin
applied for a permit to engage in a march similar to
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that proposed earlier but now rescheduled for the
F~ur~h ~f Jl1:1y. The Skokie authorities denied the perrrut, md1cating that the march would violate the last
of the three ordinances. At this point, the American
Civil Liberties Union filed suit on behalf of the NSPA
in the federal district court, contending that all the
ordinances were unconstitutional under the First
Amendment and seeking declaratory relief to that
effect. By the time the case reached the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, Skokie
had conceded that the insurance requirement (at least
as applied to the proposed march here) and the antiuniform prohibition were unconstitutional. At issue in
that court, therefore, was the city's attempt to prohibit
the promotion or incitement of hatred "against persons
by reason of their race, national origin, or religion."
The Illinois Supreme Court, on the other hand,
which was the ultimate state court to rule on the lawsuit originally filed in the state circuit court, was presented with a general claim by the city of Skokie that it
had a right to stop the proposed march without regard
to any particular ordinance provision. Following decisions by both courts, both adverse to the city of Skokie,
a petition for review was filed in the United States
Supreme Court. That Court, however, declined to take
the case for decision (two justices, Blackmun and
White, dissented from the refusal).
One of the striking characteristics about the Skokie
case is that one encounters confusion and uncertainty
wherever one turns. Take first the parties. The "Village" of Skokie is not a village in any meahingful sense
of the term, though it was obviously to its advantage to
portray itself as such to enhance our sense of the intrusion into the community by the proposed march. It is,
simply, a Chicago suburb. Even the question of whose
"turf' it is is a matter of some uncertainty. Before World
War II, Skokie had primarily been a German community, known as "Little Germany," and the home of the
German-American bund.
On the other side, the National Socialist Party,
with its few dozen members, was hardly a "party" at
all, though it too no doubt regarded the self-depiction
as advantageous for its public relations. Nor was the
extent of its identification with the policies of the Third
Reich entirely clear. Even the real identity of its leader,
Frank Collin, was a matter of doubt. Symbolic of the
deeply confusing nature of the dispute, it appeared
that Collin's father was a Jew and a survivor of Dachau.
This problem of fixing one's vision on the true reality
extended to the legal issues. Was this a march to proclaim religious and racial hatred, or even genocide?
No, said the Nazis quite explicitly from the beginning. It was to protest the denial of their "free speech
rights." The placards they proposed to carry were to
be inscribed with the words ''White Free Speech" and
"Free Speech for White America," a protest against
the demands for an insurance policy as a prerequisite
to obtaining a march permit. On the other hand, it
was possible, and not implausible, to read a negative
implication into the slogans, to the effect that only
30

"whites," and then only some "whites," should be
accorded First Amendment rights. Furthermore, the
placards were not the only communicating objects that
would be present; there was also the storm trooper
regalia Collin's group would be wearing with its own
deadly messages.
Finally, beneath this dispute about what the group
intended to say was yet another source of confusion,
namely whether the asserted desire to march was itself
fictitious. At times it seemed that the object was not to
march but to be opposed in the effort. In fact, the Nazis
never did march in Skokie, even after they had secured
the right to do so; instead, they chose to make a brief
appearance at the plaza of the Daley Center in downtown Chicago.
This problem of determining who these people
were and what they were fighting about, of separating
appearance and reality, is endemic to the case as a
whole. This is certainly true when one attempts to decipher the judicial opinions in order to discover their
motivating rationale.
On one issue, at least, the opinions are unmistakably
clear, namely, that the judges wished it known that

One of the striking characteristics about the
Skokie case is that one encounters confusion
and uncertainty wherever one turns.

they personally repudiated the ideas held by Collin
and his group. Virtually every opinion written in the
case contains somewhere within it such a personal
statement by the judges. These denouncements are
unqualified. They unambiguously proclaim the Nazi
ideology a collection of monstrous errors. The opinion
of the federal court of appeals begins with the statement: "We would hopefully surprise no one by confessing personal views that NSPA's beliefs and goals
are repugnant to the values held generally by residents
of this country, and, indeed, to much of what we cherish in civilization."
At the very end of the opinion the judges return to
the same theme, with an even stronger denunciation:
Recognizing the implication that often seems to
follow over-protestation, we nevertheless feel
compelled once again to express our repugnance
at the doctrines which the appellees desire to profess publicly. Indeed, it is a source of extreme
regret that after several thousand years of
attempting to strengthen the often thin coating of
civilization with which humankind has attempted
to hide brutal animal-like instincts, there will still
be those who will resort to hatred and vilification
of fellow human beings because of their racial
background or religious beliefs, or for that matter,
because of any reason at all.

In this way, then, the designated "legal" analysis of
the case is bracketed by these clear, uncomplicated,
"personal" resolutions of the same issues.
There is more to these personal proclamations, however, than first meets the eye. To most of us these statements would no doubt appear perfectly unremarkable;
indeed, their absence would have been regarded as
cause for concern, since an indication of personal
neutrality on the ideas of Nazism, which might arise
from that silence, would have presented a shockingly
unexpected state of affairs. But that is only because we
agree with the conclusion that Nazism is horrendously
evil. Believing so, we are less sensitive to seeing how
coercive and threatening such judicial denigrations of
the speech protected can be. What we see, instead, is
the satisfaction of the individual needs of the judges to
dissociate-themselves from the beliefs they are in the
name of the First Amendment about to protect, and
perhaps the reinforcement and reaffirmation of the
general norm, which rejects those beliefs and with
which we are ourselves in accord. It is in both functions
that the coercion occurs. For the judges' statements
make clear that those who hold these views, and act on
them in the ways that Collin's group was about to, are
deserving of our reproach; the words of the judges
themselves constitute a form of official censure and
thus a kind of coercion and punishment, as well as
the threat of other punishments.
At least on the ultimate question whether legal coercion was constitutional, however, the courts were quite
emphatic that it was not. They were less clear, on the
other hand, on the score of whether this was a desirable result and of what precisely were the justifications
for it. The opinions convey a strong sense of helplessness on the part of the judges. The dominant image
suggested by the opinions is that of judges compelled
to reach the results they did.
This sense of a predetermined result was created in
several ways. There was the usual invocation of "the
First Amendment" itself, or "the United States Constitution," as if these words and texts constituted
something firm and specific on the issue before the
courts. The judges also seemed to intimate that they
would arrive at a very different resolution if they were
deciding the case on a clean slate, but that such a resolution was foreclosed by standing precedents of a
higher court, the Supreme Court.
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court opened its opinion
by declaring it was "bound by the pronouncements of
the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation
of the United States Constitution," pronouncements
that "compel us to permit the demonstration as proposed, including the display of the swastika," and
closed with the statement that the result had been
reached "albeit reluctantly."
The federal court of appeals, after making its
opening declaration of sympathy with the beliefs of
the Skokie community, then changed ground rapidly
and pronounced its own personal views as irrelevant
to its assigned judicial task: ''.As judges sworn to.defend

the Constitution, however, we cannot decide this or
any case on that basis. Ideological tyranny, no matter
how worthy its motivation, is forbidden as much to
appointed judges as to elected legislators." The form
in which the court stated its conclusion, "[W]e find
we are unable to deny that the activities in which the
appellees wish to engage are within the protection of
the First Amendment," demonstrates the utility of the
negative form in our language as a means of conveying
a certain reluctant state of mind and, additionally in
this instance, the untouchable nature of the beliefs
being protected.

On one issue, at least, the opinions are
unmistakably clear, namely, that the judges
wished it known that they personally
repudiated the ideas held by Collin and
his group.

This theme of predetermination was executed primarily through the methodology of analysis of precedent, a process involving the comparison of various
details of this case with earlier decisions. In the Skokie
case, this process-wooden and uncritical as it wasat least offered a virtually complete description of the
doctrinal architecture of the First Amendment that has
been built up during the last five decades.
The city structured its legal argument to locate this
case within the established exceptions to the First
Amendment rules, any one of which could independently have supported the city's position. It argued
that the Nazi speech would constitute "fighting
words," which the Supreme Court had declared in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire to be unprotected, on the
ground that certain types of speech lacked sufficient
"social value" to justify protection.
In Chaplinsky the state had convicted a member
of the Jehovah's Witness sect for calling an arresting
officer a "damned fascist," among other things. Such
"fighting words," the Supreme Court held, were not
within the doctrine of free speech, as was also true, it
added, of libel, indecent language, and obscenity. Naturally, in light of this, Skokie also argued that Collin's
messages constituted "false statements of fact,"
.
which, like libel, were therefore unprotected. The city
extended this line of argument by calling the speech
"group libel," involving as it did the defamation of
Jews, which in the 1952 case of Beauharnais v. Illinois the
Supreme Court had said could also be prohibited constitutionally. Skokie further contended that what Collin
and his group had to say was "obscene" and therefore,
unprotected under established precedents dealing
with pornography.
Following on Holmes's test from Schenck and Abrams,
the city claimed that there was a "clear and present
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danger'' of a serious social harm likely to result from
the march. The speech, it said, was especially offensive
to the Jewish members of the community-in fact, the
psychic equivalent of a physical assault. Finally, the
city argued that its regulation was not really a prohibition of speech at all, but only a regulation of its "time,
place or manner," a category of regulation the Supreme
Court had repeatedly held subject to a less stringent
form of First Amendment review.
As to all these claims, the courts found fatal flaws.
The "fighting words" doctrine of Chaplinsky was said
to apply only to certain personally insulting epithets
spoken in a face-to-face encounter. Here the speech,
however obnoxious, was about "political ideas," and
it could be avoided simply by not showing up at the
village hall on the afternoon of the march. Similarly,
as to the argument that this was libel, it was answered
that these were not factual assertions, which could be

The opinions convey a strong sense of
helplessness on the part of the judges. The
dominant image suggested by the opinions is
that of judges compelled to reach the results
they did.

gauged as true or untrue, but political ideas, as to
which the Supreme Court had pronounced: "Under
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea." The Beauharnais decision, upholding a group
libel law that was not limited to factual falsehoods,
was now of doubtful validity but, in any event, was
distinguishable because it had involved a statute that
had been interpreted to apply only to instances where
there was a likelihood of violence; Skokie had by this
time withdrawn its claim that the Skokie community
was likely to respond violently to the Nazi march. Nor
could the Nazi speech be deemed "obscene," since it
lacked the requisite quality of the erotic.
The courts said further that this was not a case for
the "clear and present danger" exception. According to
more recent Supreme Court decisions, in particular the
1968 opinion of Brandenburg v. Ohio, involving racist
rhetoric at a Ku Klux Klan rally, speech could only be
prohibited on the basis of its dangerousness when it
sought to incite others to serious unlawful behavior
and persuasion was imminent. In Skokie it was, of
course, implausible that anyone likely to listen to the
Nazi speech would be immediately persuaded; the
only violence that might arise would be from spectator
hostility, which, again, the city had refrained from urging as a likely reality justifying prohibition and which,
in any event, the Supreme Court had severely limite~
(perhaps even eliminated entirely) as a relevant consideration in free speech cases in various decisions denying "hecklers" any "veto" over unwanted speech.
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Finally, as to the time, place, or manner claim, this
went afoul of a now firm distinction between regulations that sought to limit speech because of the content
of its messages and those that limited it incidentally in
the pursuit of other concerns; the exception applying
only the latter. The Skokie regulation which limited
speech because of its harmful impact on, or its offensiveness to, others, was quite clearly directed at the
content of the speech and hence subject to the severe
strictures of the First Amendment.
And so it went with the courts' doctrinal interpretation. Obviously, such a method of treatment and
analysis of the issues raised by the Skokie case did not
provide any prescriptive justification for the result
reached.
In the Skokie opinions, however, one argument for
protection, while also drawn from the precedents,
yields an attempt at positive justification. Like the
claims from precedent and higher authority, it is an
argument that implicitly portrays the judges as being
in a somewhat helpless position with respect to determining the outcome of the controversy.
This justification was simply the inability to draw
any line that would effectively exclude this kind of
speech while not intruding on speech that everyone
believed valuable and worthy of protection. Of all the
arguments advanced in the Skokie case, that heard with
the greatest frequency was this claim: to permit this
speech to be restricted would jeopardize the entire
structure of free speech rights that had been erected.
According to the most commonly used illustration of
this argument, to permit Skokie to ban this speech
because of its offensiveness would mean that Southern whites could ban civil rights marches by blacks.
The principal case used to support this proposition
was Cohen v. California, in which the Court had said that
California could not prohibit, on grounds of its offensiveness, a person from wearing in public a jacket
inscribed across its back "Fuck the Draft." To extend
to the state the power to limit "indecent speech," said
the Court, "would effectively empower a majority to
silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections." No "readily ascertainable general principle
exists" for drawing such lines, "[f]or, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps
more distasteful than others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric."
Such statements as these became the bulwark of the
decisions in Skokie: "The result we have reached," said
the federal court of appeals, "is dictated by the fundamental proposition that if these civil rights are to
remain vital for all, they must protect not only those
society deems acceptable, but also those whose ideas
it quite justifiably rejects and despises."
Given the premises or social reality offered in the
Skokie opinions, it is difficult to believe that some workable rule could not have been arrived at for the speech
at issue in that case. Speaking personally, I do not

believe that my own liberty of speech (or the speech
I think it reasonable to value) would have been threatened by grafting such an exception onto the First
Amendment, just as I do not now feel threatened by
the constitutional dispensation for obscenity laws.
Nor do I find it difficult to distinguish in my own mind
between the type of "offense" caused by blacks marching in the South for their civil rights and that brought
about by Nazis who would advocate the murder or
enslavement of a segment of the community.

In the remainder of the book, Professor Bollinger first provides a summary and critique of the established theoretical
understanding of the First Amendment, especially as it is
commonly applied to cases involving extremist speech, and
then develops an alternative conception of the social role of
free speech. This alternative conception, he argues, better
explains the shared intuition that protection of extremist
speech can strengthen the society. His theory, which he calls
the general tolerance principle, emphasizes the common difficulties involved in arriving at an appropriate response to bad
speech and nonspeech behavior and, because of this important
shared feature, the good sense involved in choosing to designate one area of social interaction-that involving speechas open for extraordinary self-restraint.

Of all the arguments advanced in the Skokie
case, that heard with the greatest frequency
was this claim: to permit this speech to
be restricted would jeopardize the entire
structure of free speech rights that had been
erected.

Of course, such personal viewpoints ought not to be
regarded as dispositive of the general issue; but they
certainly are relevant and a worthwhile starting point,
and by stating my own I hope to invite others to arrive
at their own honest judgment. It seems a significant
piece of corroborating evidence that virtually every
other western democracy does draw such a distinction
in their law; the United States stands virtually alone in
the degree to which it has decided legally to tolerate
racist rhetoric. This distinctive feature of American

Given the premises or social reality offered in
the Skokie opinions, it is difficult to believe
that some workable rule could not have been
arrived at for the speech at issue in that case.

society in the world community is highlighted by the
fact that the United States has yet to ratify either the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (which prohibits, among other
things, the "direct and public incitement to commit
genocide") or the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(which prohibits, among other things, the "dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred"),
in part because of concerns about potential conflicts
between the conventions and the First Amendment.
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